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Abstract: In the literature on measured wage inequality, only one recent study, by Glaeser 
and Mare′ (2001), has focused on the enormous wage gap between urban and non-urban 
workers in the United States. In the present paper, I replicate and extend Glaeser and 
Mare′’s original empirical work, and I present a new interpretation of the evidence based 
on my re-estimation. Contrary to Glaeser and Mare′’s theory that urban employment 
induces more rapid skill acquisition, I find that wage growth is no greater for urban 
workers than for non-urban workers. I show that both the original and extended empirical 
patterns can be fully explained by a simple spatial equilibrium model that incorporates 
two highly plausible phenomena: (1) a compensating wage differential for the higher cost 
of living in cities and (2) a dynamic tendency for more able workers to gravitate to cities 
once they discover that they belong in the “big leagues.” 
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The Wage Gap between Metropolitan and Non-metropolitan Areas 
 
I.  Introduction  
In a cross-sectional comparison of men with the same years of education and 
work experience, the wages received by workers in metropolitan areas are typically about 
30 percent higher than those received by non-metropolitan workers. When large 
metropolitan areas with a population of at least 1 million are compared to non-
metropolitan areas, the wage gap is even larger, more than 40 percent in some data sets. 
This gap is enormous, larger than many other heavily researched wage gaps, such as the 
union/non-union wage gap; however, the urban/non-urban wage gap has been almost 
completely overlooked in the literature on measured wage inequality in the United 
States.
1  There is a well-developed literature on wage differences across particular cities,
2 
but only one recent study, by Glaeser and Mare′ (2001), has focused on the wage 
difference between cities and non-cities. 
Glaeser and Mare′’s empirical analysis establishes three empirical regularities: (1) 
the cross-sectional wage gap between cities and non-cities is large; (2) it is larger for 
more experienced workers than for less experienced workers; and (3) longitudinal 
estimates of the urban/non-urban wage gap that control for worker fixed effects are much 
                                                           
1 For less developed countries, see Harris and Todaro (1970). In their seminal paper, they 
speculate that rural-to-urban migration depends on the urban/rural difference in expected 
earnings. The urban/rural wage gap is explained by the urban minimum wage, which is 
institutionally determined to be higher than that of the free market.  This wage gap is 
accompanied by a higher unemployment rate in the urban sector.  In the United States, however, 
there was hardly any difference in unemployment rates between urban and non-urban areas in 
1990.   
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smaller than the cross-sectional estimates. Glaeser and Mare′ interpret these empirical 
patterns as suggesting that urban employment is conducive to especially rapid skill 
acquisition. Surprisingly, however, they never subject that hypothesis to a test of its most 
obvious empirical implication – that urban workers exhibit steeper wage growth than 
non-urban workers. 
My own empirical analysis uses data from the decennial census, the Current 
Population Survey, and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). After replicating 
the three regularities emphasized by Glaeser and Mare′, I proceed to use the longitudinal 
data from the PSID to check their theory’s implication that wage growth is more rapid for 
urban workers than for non-urban workers. The data show no support for that hypothesis. 
I therefore consider whether the entire set of empirical regularities might be 
explained by an alternative theory. I show that all the empirical patterns can indeed be 
explained by a simple spatial equilibrium model that incorporates two highly plausible 
phenomena: (1) a compensating wage differential for the higher cost of living in cities 
and (2) a dynamic tendency for more able workers to gravitate to cities once they 
discover that they belong in the “big leagues.”  
The next section of this paper provides a brief review of the relevant theoretical 
and empirical literature. In Section III, I describe my data and present my cross-sectional 
and longitudinal evidence. In Section IV, I develop my theoretical model and 
demonstrate that it explains all the empirical patterns established in Section III. Section V 
concludes with a summary of the main findings. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2 See Roback (1982), Johnson (1983), and Rauch (1993).   3
II.  Literature Survey 
To understand the enormous urban/non-urban wage gap as an economic 
equilibrium, we need to answer two fundamental questions: (1) what factors prevent all 
the workers from flocking to the urban areas, and (2) why do urban employers remain in 
urban areas despite higher wages? As Glaeser and Mare′ note, some of the possible 
answers to these questions have been foreshadowed in the related literature on wages 
differences across different cities. As I discuss the answers suggested in the previous 
literature, I also will note their empirical implications, which I will test in Section III. 
Starting with question (1), non-urban workers may be deterred from migrating to 
cities, despite the higher urban wages, because of urban disamenities, especially the 
higher urban cost of living. Roback (1982) and Rauch (1993) suggest that the utility level 
of workers is equal across cities with different wages because the intercity wage gaps 
merely compensate for the intercity cost-of-living differences. Similarly, if the urban 
wage premium is merely a compensating difference for a higher cost of living, it does not 
induce all the non-urban workers to want to migrate to the cities. While this answer to 
question (1) is theoretically coherent, Page and Solon (2003) emphasize that its empirical 
plausibility depends on whether the urban/non-urban cost-of-living difference is large 
enough to account for the large urban/non-urban wage gap.  In Section III, I will explore 
whether it is.  
Another answer to question (1), suggested long ago by Johnson (1953), is that the 
urban workers typically have higher ability than the non-urban workers. To the extent 
that the high urban wages are a return to the high ability of the urban workers, less able 
non-urban workers have no incentive to migrate to the cities because, even if they did,   4
they would not have the ability to command the higher wages. This is a theoretically 
coherent explanation provided there is some reason for the high-ability workers to have a 
comparative advantage for urban employment. One possibility is that the density of urban 
markets generates a larger clientele for the top talent. It was an equilibrium for the best 
basketball player to work in Chicago, rather than in the hinterland, because he could 
reach a larger audience there. For similar reasons, it is unsurprising that many of the best 
ballet dancers and lawyers are drawn to New York City.
3  Again there is a 
straightforward empirical implication. If much of the observed urban/non-urban wage 
gap is a return to ability (or other worker-specific characteristics like motivation), then 
longitudinal estimates of the wage gap that control for worker “fixed effects” should be 
smaller than the cross-sectional estimates. Again I will test this implication in Section III. 
If the urban/non-urban wage gap is solely a consequence of ability differences 
between urban and non-urban workers, then question (2) is not a puzzle after all. Urban 
employers can afford to pay higher wages if they are compensated by the greater 
productivity of their high-ability workers. On the other hand, if the urban wage premium 
is not completely explained by ability differences (e.g., if a substantial urban/non-urban 
wage gap is estimated even after controlling for worker fixed effects), question (2) still 
requires an answer. In that case, urban employers could thrive in the face of higher labor 
costs if that cost disadvantage is offset by various cost or productivity advantages. One of 
these is lower transportation costs (Krugman, 1991). Another possible economy of 
agglomeration, emphasized by Lucas (1988), is the productivity advantage from greater 
knowledge spillovers in urban areas.   
                                                           
3 Rosen (1981) makes a similar argument for why the most able workers should rise to the top of 
organizational hierarchies.   5
Glaeser and Mare′ espouse a variation on Lucas’s theme.  If the knowledge 
spillovers operate on individual workers rather than firms, then urban workers, even if 
they are not initially more able, might gradually accumulate more human capital than 
non-urban workers. One empirical implication, corroborated by Glaeser and Mare′, is that 
the cross-sectional wage gap between cities and non-cities is greater for more 
experienced workers.  Another, which Glaeser and Mare′ do not report checking, is that 
longitudinal wage growth is greater for urban workers than for non-urban workers. I 
check both empirical implications in the next section. 
 
III.  Empirical Evidence  
3.1.  Data 
I use data from the 1990 census 1 percent Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS), 
the 1991 March Current Population Survey (CPS), and the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID). I use the census and the CPS for cross-sectional estimation only, and I 
use the PSID for both cross-sectional and longitudinal estimation. The census data 
provide the largest sample, and the CPS is used here to check the robustness of the results 
from the other data sets. The PSID is a longitudinal survey conducted by the University 
of Michigan Survey Research Center. I exclude the Survey of Economic Opportunity 
sample to eliminate oversampling of poor families. In all data sets, I restrict my samples 
to male heads of household.
4  I use only positive earners between the ages of 18 and 65.  
                                                           
4 I also have investigated female heads of household with the same restrictions, and the wage 
patterns of female heads across areas are extremely similar to those of male heads. For 
consistency with Glaeser and Mare′’s analysis, I restrict my census and CPS samples to workers 
who usually worked at least 35 hours per week over the previous year.    6
My wage variable is average hourly earnings, constructed as annual labor 
earnings divided by annual hours of work. My main analysis of the PSID uses a balanced 
panel of seven years of data from 1985 to 1991 for the same head of household. Reported 
wage information is based on the previous calendar year, so earnings observations come 
from the interviews for 1986 to 1992. Thus, for 1991, wage information ascertained from 
the 1992 interview is the basis for the dependent variable, and personal characteristics 
and regional information from the 1991 interview are the basis for the explanatory 
variables. My main longitudinal analysis is limited to the years 1985-1991 because I use 
the new metropolitan status variable that first became available in 1985. The PSID 
metropolitan status variable used in Glaeser and Mare′ is based on the 1960 census, 
which induces substantial measurement error due to outdated metropolitan status. The 
new metropolitan variable is based on the 1980 census.
5 
The concept of a Metropolitan Area (MA) is a large population nucleus together 
with adjacent communities that have a high degree of economic and social integration 
with that nucleus. Each MA must contain either a place with a minimum population of 
50,000 or a Census Bureau-defined urbanized area and a total MA population of at least 
100,000. The MA is subdivided into “central city” and “suburban areas.” The areas 
located outside the metropolitan areas are referred to as non-metropolitan areas. The 
standards provide a flexible structure of metropolitan definitions that classify a 
metropolitan area either as a metropolitan statistical area (MSA) or as a consolidated 
metropolitan statistical area (CMSA) that is divided into primary metropolitan statistical 
areas (PMSA’s). In the present paper I use MSA/PMSA as metropolitan areas in the 
                                                           
5 For comparison purposes, I also try using the same first 18 waves of the PSID that Glaeser and 
Mare′ did with their metropolitan status indicator.   7
census and the CPS, and I use MA in the PSID. The census and the CPS metropolitan 
areas are based on the city-level data, but the metropolitan areas in the PSID are based on 
the county-level data. To examine wage differences between metropolitan areas of 
different sizes, I will divide metropolitan areas into large metropolitan areas of 1 million 
or more and smaller metropolitan areas. Furthermore, I will investigate wage patterns 
between central cities and suburban areas in large metropolitan areas.  
Aside from the metropolitan/non-metropolitan indicators, the explanatory 
variables will include region dummies, a race dummy, a polynomial in potential 
experience (age-years of schooling-6), and education dummies as defined in Table 1. 
Table 1 lists the code number of each PSID variable and the name of each census 
variable,
6 and Table 2 shows the variables’ sample means and standard deviations. 
The sample proportions living in metropolitan areas are very similar across data 
sets. The proportion of the census sample recorded as living in a metropolitan area is 77.6 
percent. The log point urban/non-urban wage gap is 0.30. In the PSID, 71.3 percent of the 
sample lives in a metropolitan area, and the wage gap is 0.41. The CPS shows a similar 
proportion of metropolitan residents and log point urban/non-urban wage gap as in the 
census, which is not consistent with Glaeser and Mare′.
7 
                                                           
6 The variable names in the CPS are very similar to those for the census, so I list only the census 
names.  
 
7 The census data also include information regarding “place of work,” which enables study of the 
wage patterns of commuters between areas. In the census, 79.4 percent work in metropolitan 
areas, which is slightly higher than the percentage that resides in metropolitan areas. This 
discrepancy implies the existence of workers commuting from non-metropolitan areas to 
metropolitan areas. The existence of commuting workers, who comprise only a few percent of 
each sample, is not of much consequence for most of my subsequent cross-sectional and 
longitudinal estimation.  For example, in the census, if I classify metropolitan workers according 
to place of work instead of residence, the estimate of the metropolitan coefficient in my wage 
equation increases from 0.222 to 0.233.    8
3.2.  Cross-sectional estimation 
In this section, I use all three data sets to study the cross-sectional urban/non-
urban wage gap. In the simplest analyses, I apply ordinary least squares to the linear 
regression model  
i i i i D X w ε δ β + + ′ = ln                         (3-1) 
where  i w ln  is worker i’s log hourly wage rate,  i X  is a vector of individual 
characteristics and region dummies, and  i D  is a metropolitan dummy variable equal to 1 
if the individual lives in a metropolitan area. My census and CPS data sets are cross-
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the seven-year average of the individual’s log wage, and the explanatory variables are 
similarly averaged over time. Unlike Glaeser and Mare′’s supposedly cross-sectional 
analysis, which mixes both the “between” and “within” variation in pooled annual data 
from the PSID, my cross-sectional analysis uses only the “between” variation across 
individuals and therefore is more comparable to the census and CPS analyses. 
The first column of Table 3 shows the coefficient estimates from the census data. 
The estimated coefficient of the metropolitan dummy,  222 . 0 ˆ = δ , implies a 
metropolitan/non-metropolitan wage gap of 25 percent (calculated as  1
222 . 0 − e ). The 
corresponding estimate from the CPS in the third column implies a wage gap of 26 
percent, and the PSID-based estimate in the fifth column implies a gap of 36 percent. 
Thus, the estimated urban/non-urban wage gap ranges from 25 percent to 36 percent.   9
The specifications in the second, fourth, and sixth columns of Table 3 allow 
separate coefficients for large metropolitan areas (containing at least a million residents) 
and small ones. In all three data sets, the coefficient estimates are larger for large 
metropolitan areas than for small ones. In the census, for example, the coefficient 
estimate is 0.27 for large metropolitan areas and 0.16 for small ones. 
My estimates from the census and CPS are consistent with Glaeser and Mare’s 
census-based estimates. At first, however, my PSID-based estimates seem larger than 
theirs. As mentioned above, Glaeser and Mare′’s estimates come from applying OLS to 
pooled longitudinal data. This estimator is a weighted average of the “between” estimator 
that I use in my cross-sectional analysis and the “within” estimator that controls for 
worker-specific fixed effects. As I will show in my longitudinal analysis in the next sub-
section, the within or fixed-effects estimate turns out to be much smaller than the 
between estimate, mainly because the within estimate controls for unobserved ability 
differences between urban and non-urban workers. By mixing the within variation with 
the between variation, Glaeser and Mare′ cause their supposedly cross-sectional estimates 
from the PSID to come out smaller than mine. 
Table 4 reports a series of regression analyses that facilitate comparison between 
my PSID results and Glaeser and Mare′’s. Using both my 1985-1991 panel and an 
unbalanced panel from Glaeser and Mare′’s 1968-1985 period (along with their 
metropolitan indicator), I estimate equation (3-1) both with the between estimator and 
with OLS applied to the pooled individual observations from all years. As shown in the 
last column, switching from my 1985-1991 period to Glaeser and Mare′’s 1968-1985 
period only slightly reduces the between estimate of the metropolitan coefficient, from   10
0.308 to 0.294. The main reason for their smaller estimates is that their OLS estimator 
mixes the genuinely cross-sectional between variation with the within variation used by 
the fixed-effects estimator. As shown in the first column of the bottom panel, using the 
OLS estimator instead of the between estimator with the 1968-1985 data reduces the 
estimated metropolitan coefficient from 0.294 to 0.242.
8  The second column of Table 4 
highlights one other problem with Glaeser and Mare′’s OLS estimation – their standard 
error estimation falsely assumes that observations of the same worker in different years 
are independent. The second column reports Huber/White standard error estimates that 
account for serial correlation among the error terms in different years for the same 
workers. These corrected standard error estimates are more than twice as large as the 
uncorrected ones. 
As discussed in Section II, one likely reason for the urban/non-urban wage gap is 
a compensating differential for the higher cost of living in urban areas. Table 5 reports a 
series of analyses that explore the importance of this factor.  In the first, third, and fifth 
columns (labeled LHS for adjustment of the left-hand-side variable), I reestimate 
equation (3-1) with a new dependent variable, the log wage deflated by a local cost-of-
living index. This variable is constructed as    
i i i real p w w ln ln ln , θ − =                                                                                      (3-3) 
where  i p  is an index measuring interarea variation in housing prices and θ  is the typical 
expenditure share devoted to housing. In Section IV below, I demonstrate formally that 
the expression in equation (3-3) is an appropriate way to adjust for variation in housing 
                                                           
8 In the top part of the table, switching from the between estimator to OLS causes a smaller 
reduction because, with only a seven-year panel, the OLS estimator gives less weight to the 
within variation than it does with Glaeser and Mare′’s eighteen-year panel.    11
costs.  In most of my analyses, I set θ  at 0.25 because the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Consumer Expenditure Survey for 1990 reported that the average household spent 24 
percent of its gross income on shelter and utilities. 
The reason for using only the housing component in regional cost-of-living 
variation is that variation in housing prices is the main source of interarea differences in 
cost of living according to the National Research Council’s Panel on Poverty and Family 
Assistance.
9  In any case, more general cost-of-living statistics for both metropolitan and 
non-metropolitan areas are not available.  I measure  i p  with the cost-of-housing 
(including utilities) index values reported by the National Research Council panel.
10  
These values are categorized (relative to 1 for the United States as a whole) by region 
(census division) and urbanicity.  
Comparing the LHS results in Table 5 to the corresponding results in Table 3 
shows that, in all three data sets, adjusting the wage variable for differences in cost of 
living does reduce the estimated metropolitan coefficient by about 0.1. This reduction is 
statistically significant in all three data sets. Despite the reduction, the metropolitan 
coefficient estimate remains statistically significant and substantially positive, at about 
0.13 in the census, 0.13 in the CPS, and 0.20 in the PSID. These results suggest that 
compensation for the higher urban cost of living is part, but only part, of the explanation 
for the urban/non-urban wage gap. 
In reality, other consumption goods besides housing, such as labor services and 
property taxes, might be more expensive in urban areas. Thus, adjusting for only housing 
                                                           
9 Citro and Michael (1995), p. 183. 
 
10 Citro and Michael (1995), Table 3-6. 
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price variation may under-adjust for the cost-of-living variation.
11  I have performed two 
experiments to consider the possibility of under-adjustment. First, I have checked the 
sensitivity of my results to varying the value of θ .  Raising θ  within a reasonable range 
reduces, but does not eliminate, the estimated urban/non-urban wage gap.  In the census 
data, for example, using a θ  of 0.33 instead of 0.25 reduces the estimated metropolitan 
coefficient from 0.129 to 0.099. Second, in the second, fourth, and sixth columns of 
Table 5, instead of adjusting the left-hand-side variable with an assumed value of θ , I 
use  i p ln  as an additional right-hand-side variable with an unconstrained coefficient.  If 
workers with higher unobserved ability tend to locate in more expensive areas, this 
approach will over-adjust for cost of living, but it seems worthwhile to check how the 
results are affected. This approach does further reduce the estimated metropolitan 
coefficient, but, in two of the three data sets, the estimated coefficient remains positive 
and statistically significant. 
The census and the CPS sub-divide metropolitan area into central cities, suburban 
areas, and other metropolitan areas. I also observe central counties of metropolitan areas 
of 1 million or more in the PSID. The PSID provides a more restricted definition of 
central cities because these areas are also in the metropolitan areas of 1 million or more. 
In other words, I observe only central counties and fringe counties in large metropolitan 
areas. Table 6 reports results from specifications that distinguish these different portions 
of metropolitan areas. In the PSID, the coefficient estimates are 0.37 for central cities and 
0.43 for suburban areas. The CPS and census estimates also are greater for suburban 
                                                           
11 On the other hand, as Page and Solon (2003) note, the lower transportation costs and superior 
consumer amenities in metropolitan areas imply that adjusting only for housing costs may over-
adjust for the cost-of-living difference between metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas.   13
areas than for central cities. The place-of-work information in the census clearly shows 
that the commuters have higher wages. As shown in the second column of the table, 
individuals who work in central cities tend to have higher wages than those who work in 
suburban areas.   
In Table 7, following Glaeser and Mare′, I examine how the urban/non-urban 
wage gap varies with education and experience. F-tests of the hypothesis of zero 
coefficients for the interactions of the metropolitan dummy with the education and 
experience variables reject that hypothesis. In all three data sets, the urban/non-urban 
wage gap is greater at higher levels of education. In the census, for example, as shown in 
the table and in Figure 1, the estimated metropolitan coefficient is 0.15 greater at 16 years 
of education than at 12 years of education.  
Like Glaeser and Mare′, I also find that the urban/non-urban wage gap is greater 
for more experienced workers. Figure 2, for example, shows that in the census data the 
metropolitan coefficient is estimated to be more than 0.1 greater at ten years of 
experience than at zero experience. 
To summarize, my cross-sectional analyses of the census, CPS, and PSID 
corroborate Glaeser and Mare′’s finding of a very large wage gap between metropolitan 
and non-metropolitan areas. I have extended their work by adjusting for cost-of-living 
differences, and my results suggest that compensation for the higher cost of living in 
urban areas accounts for only part of the wage gap. I also have replicated Glaeser and 
Mare′’s finding that the urban/non-urban wage gap is greater for more experienced 
workers. 
   14
3.3.  Longitudinal estimation 
The cross-sectional estimates in Section 3.2 suggest that urban wages exceed non-
urban wages by more than can be explained solely by differences in cost of living. As 
discussed in Section II, one possible reason that urban workers tend to earn higher real 
wages is that they typically are more able. If so, one would expect that longitudinal 
estimates of the wage gap that control for worker “fixed effects” would turn out to be 
substantially smaller than the cross-sectional estimates.  In this sub-section, I use the 
longitudinal PSID data from 1985-1991 to explore that implication. 
First, I control for worker fixed effects by estimating the “within” regression, that 
is, by applying OLS to the mean-differenced equation 
i it i it i it i it D D X X w w ε ε δ β − + − + − ′ = − ) ( ) ( ln ln                                          (3-4) 







it i Z Z . As shown in the first column of Table 8, this 
produces an estimated metropolitan coefficient of  113 . 0 ˆ = δ .
12 As conjectured, this 
estimate is far below the corresponding cross-sectional estimate of 0.308 in Table 3, 
suggesting that much of the latter estimate is really a return to unobserved ability. 
Interestingly, the within estimate of 0.113 appears to just compensate for the 0.1 
urban/non-urban cost-of-living difference estimated in the previous sub-section. The 
second column of Table 8 addresses this point directly by re-estimating equation (3-4) 
with the wage variable deflated for cost of living. The resulting estimate of the 
metropolitan coefficient is 0.008, almost exactly zero. That is, the combination of 
                                                           
12 The reported standard error estimates are the conventional type that assumes no serial 
correlation remains in the error term once the fixed effects have been controlled for. Using 
Arellano’s (1987) covariance matrix estimator that is robust to serial correlation produces 
modestly larger standard error estimates.    15
accounting for cost-of-living differences and accounting for workers’ unobserved ability 
with fixed effects almost exactly explains the entire estimated urban/non-urban wage gap. 
  An alternative explanation for why the within estimate is less than the between 
estimate is that within estimation magnifies the downward errors-in-variables bias from 
classification error in the metropolitan dummy. To examine this possibility, I follow 
Griliches and Hausman’s (1986) suggestion to control for fixed effects by applying OLS 
to the long-differenced, rather than mean-differenced, equation 
  1985 , 1991 , 1985 , 1991 , 1985 , 1991 , 1985 , 1991 , ) ( ) ( ln ln i i i i i i i i D D X X w w ε ε δ β − + − + − ′ = − .  (3-5) 
The idea is that measuring change in metropolitan status over a longer time period 
captures more “signal” relative to “noise” in the measured change and therefore reduces 
the errors-in-variables bias. As shown in the third column of Table 8, this approach does 
indeed increase the estimated metropolitan coefficient from 0.113 to 0.142. Still, this 
estimate remains much smaller than the cross-sectional estimate.  
The long-differenced specification in equation (3-5) is readily extended to the 
more general model 
mm i mn i nm i i i i i D D D X X w w , 3 , 2 , 1 1985 , 1991 , 1985 , 1991 , ) ( ln ln δ δ δ β + + + − ′ = −  
       1985 , 1991 , i i ε ε − +                                                                (3-6) 
where  nm i D ,  is a dummy variable that equals 1 if, between 1985 and 1991, worker i 
moved from non-metropolitan to metropolitan;  mn i D ,  equals 1 if he moved from 
metropolitan to non-metropolitan; and  mm i D ,  equals 1 if he lived in a metropolitan area in 
both 1985 and 1991. The three δ  coefficients represent the relative wage growths of the 
three categories compared to the omitted category of staying in a non-metropolitan area.   16
Relative to this generalized model, the model in equation (3-5) imposes the restrictions 
0 3 = δ  and  1 2 δ δ − = . 
  As shown in the last column of Table 8, OLS estimation of equation (3-6) yields 
187 . 0 ˆ
1 = δ , 097 . 0 ˆ
2 − = δ , and  013 . 0 ˆ
3 − = δ . Thus, the wage gap suggested by the wage 
growth of movers from non-metropolitan to metropolitan areas is somewhat larger than 
the 0.142 value estimated in the third column, while the gap suggested by the movers 
from metropolitan to non-metropolitan areas is somewhat smaller. The most striking 
result, however, is the estimate of  3 δ .  Glaeser and Mare′ claim that the urban/non-urban 
wage gap arises because urban employment is conducive to more rapid human capital 
accumulation. If that were the real story, stayers in metropolitan areas should exhibit 
more rapid wage growth than stayers in non-metropolitan areas, i.e.,  3 δ  should be 
positive. The insignificantly negative estimate of  3 δ  indicates no empirical support 
whatsoever for Glaeser and Mare′’s interpretation.
13 
 
IV.  The Model 
The previous section documented a series of empirical regularities. My cross-
sectional estimates indicate that the urban/non-urban wage gap is very large, exceeds the 
amount necessary to compensate for the higher urban cost of living, and is larger among 
more experienced workers. My longitudinal estimates, which control for worker fixed 
effects, are smaller than the cross-sectional estimates and are just sufficient to 
                                                           
13 I obtain similar results after excluding workers who lived in a metropolitan (or non-
metropolitan) area in both 1985 and 1991, but had switched back and forth between 1985 and 
1991. In a somewhat related analysis, Glaeser and Mare′ investigate the time pattern of wage   17
compensate for the higher urban cost of living. Contrary to Glaeser and Mare′’s story 
about more rapid skill acquisition in cities, workers in metropolitan areas exhibit no more 
wage growth than workers in non-metropolitan areas. In this section, I develop a simple 
spatial equilibrium model that accords with this entire set of empirical regularities.  
In my model, more able workers have a comparative advantage in the urban 
sector and therefore tend to concentrate in cities. Thus, the cross-sectional wage gap 
between urban and non-urban areas exceeds the cost-of-living difference because it is 
partly a return to the higher ability of urban workers. Longitudinal estimates of the wage 
gap that control for worker fixed effects come out smaller because they control for 
unobserved ability. My model, like Gibbons and Katz’s (1992) model of wage 
differences and worker sorting among industries, assumes that workers are not at first 
fully aware of their ability levels, but learn them over time. The ability sorting of workers 
between the urban and non-urban sectors therefore is a gradual process, with the ability 
gap between the two sectors growing as workers gravitate to their sector of comparative 
advantage. As a consequence, the wage gap between the two sectors is larger for more 
experienced workers. This gradual sorting process can also be explained by time-
consuming search process. Workers and firms could have full information about the 
workers’ ability types, but the workers’ efficient allocation might be gradually achieved 
due to search or mobility cost. The gradual sorting by learning is one of theoretical 
interpretations which are consistent with the data.  The remainder of this section presents 
a simple formalization of this story. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
changes for movers to and from metropolitan areas. Their results from both the PSID and the 
NLSY show no clear tendency for greater wage growth in the years following a move to a city.        18
4.1.  Worker preferences 
Consider a stationary population of overlapping generations, each of which works 
for two periods (t=1, 2).  In each period, each worker i chooses between working in the 
metropolitan sector ( 1 = it D ) or the non-metropolitan sector ( 0 = it D ). 
The worker’s valuation of working in each sector follows the indirect utility 
function  D w V α − = ln  where w is the worker’s opportunity wage in that sector. Thus, 
the worker would choose the metropolitan sector if and only if his metropolitan log wage 
exceeds his non-metropolitan log wage by at least α , the metropolitan wage premium 
needed to compensate for the higher cost of living (or other metropolitan disamenities net 
of the amenities). 
This indirect utility function is consistent with a utility maximization in which the 
worker maximizes the Cobb-Douglas utility function  H X ln ln ) 1 ( θ θ + −  subject to the 
budget constraint  pH X w + = , where  X  is the worker’s consumption of a traded good 
(which is treated as the numeraire), H is his consumption of a non-traded good (H  for 
housing), and  p  is the sector’s price of the non-traded good. It is straightforward to show 
that the resulting indirect utility function is  = V constant p w ln ln θ − + . Apart from the 
constant, this is the same as the assumed indirect utility function with  ) / ln( n m p p θ α =  
where  n m p p /  is the housing price ratio between the metropolitan and non-metropolitan 
sectors. Note that this result accords with the method of price deflation used above in 
Section III. 
 
4.2.  Productivity by sector and ability   19
Although worker preferences are homogeneous, worker abilities are not. Workers 
are of two types, high-ability and low-ability, and they contribute differently to each 
sector’s production of the traded good  X . 
In each sector  j  ( n m j , = ), many competitive firms produce  X  with a constant-
returns-to-scale technology, which aggregates to the sectoral production function 
) , ( Lj Lj Hj Hj j j j N N K F T X η η + =                                                                        (4-1) 
where  j T  is a sector-specific productivity factor,  j K  is the capital input (including land), 
Hj N  and  Lj N  are the sector’s numbers of high- and low-ability workers, and  Hj η  and  Lj η  
represent the relative productivities of the two ability types in sector  j .  If cities enjoy 
some of the productivity advantages discussed in Section II,  n m T T > . The greater 
productivity of high-ability workers in both sectors is expressed by  Lj Hj η η > , and the 
comparative advantage of high-ability workers in urban employment is expressed by 
) / ( ) / ( Ln Hn Lm Hm η η η η > . 
  At the time young workers choose their sector in  1 = t , they (and the employers) 
are ignorant of their ability types.  All that is (commonly) known at that point is that a 
proportion π  of the population has high ability. Immediately upon the initiation of 
production in period 1, each worker’s ability becomes publicly known. This knowledge 
informs the employers’ decisions about wages in both periods, and it informs the 
workers’ sectoral choices for the second period.   20
4.3.  Labor market equilibrium 
With competitive markets, the employers equate wages to value of marginal 
product. Consequently,  Hj j j Hj F T w η 2 = ,  Lj j j Lj F T w η 2 = , and thus  ) / ( ) / ( Lj Hj Lj Hj w w η η = .  










                                                                                                  (4-2) 
or, equivalently, that  
0 ln ln ln ln > − > − Ln Hn Lm Hm w w w w .                                                               (4-3) 
Now consider an equilibrium in which young workers select into both the 
metropolitan and non-metropolitan sectors. Given that the workers are initially ignorant 
about their ability levels, this requires that they be indifferent between the two sectors 
and choose between them randomly.  Thus, if the workers are risk-neutral and maximize 
the expected value of the utility function in Section 4.1, 
] ln ) 1 ( ln [ ln ) 1 ( ln ) (ln ) (ln Ln Hn Lm Hm n m w w w w w E w E π π π π α − + − − + = − =  
           ) ln )(ln 1 ( ) ln (ln Ln Lm Hn Hm w w w w − − + − = π π .                                            (4-4) 
Since α  equals a weighted average of the metropolitan/non-metropolitan log wage gaps 
of the two ability types, and since (4-3) implies that the high-ability gap exceeds the low-
ability gap, it follows that 
α > − Hn Hm w w ln ln                                                                                            (4-5) 
and 
α < − Ln Lm w w ln ln .                                                                                           (4-6) 
Note that inequalities (4-5) and (4-6) determine the sectoral sorting of workers in 
period 2, when the workers are aware of their ability levels and gravitate to their sector of   21
comparative advantage. High-ability workers sort into the metropolitan sector because 
their metropolitan wage premium exceeds the cost-of-living differential α , and low-
ability workers choose the non-metropolitan sector because their metropolitan wage 
premium falls short of α . 
We are now in a position to collect the full set of implications for cross-sectional 
and longitudinal wage patterns. Starting with cross-sectional implications, equation (4-4) 
tells us that, for young workers, the average log wage gap between the metropolitan and 
non-metropolitan sectors equals the cost-of-living differential α .  For older workers, 
who have sorted by ability, inequalities (4-5) and (4-2) enable this characterization of the 
metropolitan/non-metropolitan log wage gap: 
α > − > − Hn Hm Ln Hm w w w w ln ln ln ln .                                                              (4-7) 
The wage gap for older workers exceeds the cost-of-living differential α  because it 
reflects both the cost-of-living differential and the ability difference between 
metropolitan and non-metropolitan workers. 
Cross-sectional estimation of a single metropolitan/non-metropolitan wage gap 
that pools the younger and older workers will tend to produce an estimate greater than α  
because it will average the α  gap for younger workers with the greater-than-α  gap for 
older workers. This accords with my finding in Section III that the cross-sectional wage 
gap exceeds the cost-of-living differential. Furthermore, an empirical analysis that allows 
the metropolitan/non-metropolitan wage gap to vary with experience will find that it 
increases with experience. Thus, my model explains that empirical regularity without 
resorting to Glaeser and Mare′’s claim that cities enable more rapid skill acquisition.    22
Instead, I explain the empirical pattern as the effect of dynamic ability sorting across 
sectors. 
The longitudinal implications can be drawn from Table 9, which lists the sector 
and wage in each period for the high- and low-ability workers. Since my model abstracts 
from wage growth due to human capital accumulation, both the low-ability workers who 
stay in the non-metropolitan sector and the high-ability workers who stay in the 
metropolitan sector experience zero wage growth. Thus, my model, unlike Glaeser and 
Mare′’s, accords with my empirical finding in Section III of no difference in wage growth 
between metropolitan and non-metropolitan stayers. 
High-ability workers who start in the non-metropolitan sector move to the 
metropolitan sector and experience a wage gain of  α > − Hn Hm w w ln ln , while low-ability 
workers who move from the metropolitan sector to the non-metropolitan sector 
experience a wage loss  Lm Ln w w ln ln −  that is less than α  in absolute value. Therefore, a 
simple longitudinal fixed-effects estimator that estimates a single metropolitan/non-
metropolitan wage gap based on the pooled relative wage changes of the movers in both 
directions will estimate a weighted average of the above-α  value for the high-ability 
movers and the below-α  value based on the low-ability movers.  This accords with my 
empirical finding in Section III that the fixed-effects estimate is considerably smaller than 
the cross-sectional estimate and approximately equals the cost-of-living differential. 
Furthermore, my model’s combination of an above-α  wage growth for non-
metropolitan-to-metropolitan movers and a below-α  wage loss for metropolitan-to-non-
metropolitan movers accords remarkably well with the empirical pattern shown in the last 
column of Table 8.   23
V.  Conclusion 
In this paper, I have replicated and extended Glaeser and Mare′’s empirical 
analysis of the urban/non-urban wage gap, and I have taken issue with their interpretation 
of the evidence. My cross-sectional analysis indicates that the urban/non-urban wage gap 
is large, exceeds the cost-of-living differential, and is greater for more experienced 
workers. My longitudinal fixed-effects estimates that control for unobserved ability are 
smaller than the cross-sectional estimates and approximately equal the cost-of-living 
differential. Furthermore, my longitudinal evidence that urban stayers experience no 
faster wage growth than non-urban stayers contradicts Glaeser and Mare′’s theory that 
urban employment is conducive to more rapid skill acquisition. 
My own theory accounts for the entire set of empirical regularities in terms of two 
highly plausible phenemena: (1) a compensating wage differential for the higher cost of 
living in cities and (2) a dynamic tendency for more able workers to gravitate to cities 
once they discover that they belong in the “big leagues.” Cross-sectional estimates 
exceed the cost-of-living differential because they also reflect a return to the greater 
ability of urban workers, and they increase with workers’ experience because the sectoral 
sorting by ability occurs over time. Because the cross-sectional wage gap arises partly 
from the ability difference between urban and non-urban workers, longitudinal estimates 
that “difference out” the effects of unobserved ability come out smaller than cross-
sectional estimates of the urban/non-urban wage gap. 
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Table 1.  Description of Variables 
 
  Description of variables 
PSID 1985-1991   
Log of Hourly 
Earnings 
Log hourly wage rate of male head of family (V21484/V20344 in 1992 
interview year in PSID) 
Metropolitan  Metropolitan dummy equals to one if individual lives in the metropolitan 
area, otherwise zero (V20192 in 1991 interview year in PSID)
14 
North East  Regional dummy equals to one if individual lives in north-east region, 
otherwise zero (V20189 in 1991 interview year in PSID) 
North Central  Regional dummy equals to one if individual lives in north-central region, 
otherwise zero (V20189 in 1991 interview year in PSID) 
West  Regional dummy equals to one if individual lives in west region, otherwise 
zero (V20189 in 1991 interview year in PSID) 
White  Race dummy equals to one if individual is white, otherwise zero (V20114 in 
1991 interview year in PSID) 
Experience  Potential experience (Age of head-years of completed education-6, 
maximum of age is 65) (Age variable is V30692 in 1991 interview year in 
PSID) 
Education  Years of completed education (V30703 in 1991 interview year in PSID), 
Five education dummies: [0,9
 years of schooling], [10, 11], [13,15: some 
college, but no degree], [16 years of schooling: Bachelor’s degree], [more 





Log of Hourly 
Earnings 
Log hourly wage rate of male head of household 
(INCOME1/WEEK89*HOUR89) 
Metropolitan  Metropolitan dummy equals to one if individual lives in the metropolitan 
area, otherwise zero (MSA/PMSA codes 0040-9998 excluding 9997 of 
mixed areas, POWPUMA for the place of work) 
North East  Regional dummy equals to one if individual lives in north-east region, 
otherwise zero (DIVISION: codes 1,2) 
North Central  Regional dummy equals to one if individual lives in north-central region, 
otherwise zero (DIVISION: codes 3,4) 
West  Regional dummy equals to one if individual lives in west region, otherwise 
zero (DIVISION: codes 8,9) 
White  Race dummy equals to one if individual is white, otherwise zero (RACE) 
Experience  Potential experience (Age of head-years of completed education-6, 
maximum of age is 65) (AGE-YEARSCH-6) 
Education  Educational attainment (YEARSCH), Five education dummies: [0,9
 years 
of schooling], [10, 11], [13,15: some college, but no degree], [16 years of 
schooling: Bachelor’s degree], [more than 16 years of schooling: Master’s 




                                                           
14 See section 3.1 for details of definitions of metropolitan areas.    26
Table 2.  Sample Statistics 
 












Log hourly wage  2.54(0.67)  2.61(0.66)  2.31(0.66) 
White 0.873(0.33)  0.857(0.35)  0.927(0.26) 
NE 0.19(0.39)  0.23((0.42)  0.05(0.22) 
NC 0.26(0.44)  0.22(0.41)  0.43(0.49) 
West 0.23(0.42)  0.24(0.43)  0.18(0.38) 
Experience  23.38(11.17) 23.25(11.13) 23.85(11.30) 
Education 13.18(2.75)  13.39(2.77)  12.49(2.57) 
1990 census 





Log hourly wage  2.54(0.67)  2.61(0.66)  2.30(0.67) 
White 0.873(0.33)  0.859(0.34)  0.925(0.26) 
NE 0.19(0.39)  0.22(0.42)  0.06(0.24) 
NC 0.26(0.44)  0.22((0.41)  0.40(0.49) 
West 0.23(0.42)  0.23(0.42)  0.18(0.38) 
Experience  23.38(11.17) 23.29(11.13) 23.72(11.32) 
Education 13.18(2.75)  13.34(2.77)  12.58(2.61) 
1991 CPS 





Log hourly wage  2.48(0.67)   2.56(0.64)  2.26(0.72) 
White 0.89(0.32)  0.87(0.33)  0.92(0.27) 
NE 0.21(0.41)  0.26(0.44)  0.08(0.28) 
NC 0.27(0.44)  0.23(0.42)  0.37(0.48) 
West 0.25(0.43)  0.26(0.44)  0.23(0.42) 
Experience  20.82(11.20) 20.59(11.16) 21.45(11.28) 
Education 13.34(2.97)  13.51(3.07)  12.86(2.64) 
 PSID 1985-1991 








Log hourly wage  2.52(0.66)  2.64(0.64)  2.23(0.63) 
White 0.93(0.40)  0.92(0.27)  0.95(0.21) 
NE 0.20(0.46)  0.25(0.43)  0.09(0.28) 
NC 0.31(0.37)  0.27(0.44)  0.40(0.49) 
West 0.17(0.37)  0.20(0.40)  0.11(0.31) 
Experience 19.34(9.96) 19.25(9.93) 19.60(10.02) 
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Table 3.  Cross-Sectional Estimates of Metropolitan/Non-metropolitan Wage Gap 
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Table 4.  Sensitivity of PSID Estimates to Sample Period and Estimation Method 
 
  OLS OLS  with  Huber-White 
Covariance 
Between Estimation 









Time Dummies  Yes  Yes  No 
Intercept 1.30(0.0023)
a   1.30(0.149)










NC  0.016(0.013) 0.016(0.029) 0.017(0.031) 
West 0.031(0.016)


































3  6.9E-6(0.000012) 6.9E-6(0.000014) 0.000057(0.000071) 
Experience
4 -6.0E-9(0.000012)  -6.0E-9(1.97E-7)  -5.4E-7(7.4E-7) 









Time Dummies  Yes  Yes  No 
Intercept 0.505(0.020)
a   0.505(0.020)


























































a 2.57E-8(1.71E-8)  1.9E-8(1.0E-8)
b 
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Table 5. Cross-Sectional Estimates with Adjustments for Cost of Living 
 
1990 census  1991 CPS  PSID (1985-1991) 



























































































































































































































































































Cost of living    1.237    
(0.021)
a 
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Place of Residence  Place of Work  Place of Residence  Place of Residence 
 
Coef.(SE), R
2=0.21 Coef(SE),  R










































































































































































































































































Superscripts a, b, and c represent statistical significance at, respectively, the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.   32




Long Difference Estimation  
(1985-1991), (N=1655) 
 




























Time Dummies  Yes  Yes  No  No 









      (Dnm) 0.187 
(0.091)
b 
      (Dmn) -0.097 
(0.091) 
      (Dmm) 
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nd period log 
wage 
∆ log wage 
  Stayer    High     Hm w ln        Hm w ln   0    Metro 
  Mover    High     Hn w ln        Hm w ln   α > − Hn Hm w w ln ln  
   Stayer    Low     Ln w ln        Ln w ln   0    Non-metro 















Positive Interaction between Years of Schooling and the Wage Gap for 































































Positive Interaction between Potential Experience and the 
Metro/Non-metro Wage Gap  for Men with 12 Years of 
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